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  
Abstract— Advances in smart devices has witnessed major 
developments in many mobile applications such as Android 
applications. These smart devices normally interconnect to the 
internet using wireless technology and applications using the 
TFTP protocol among these wireless devices are becoming 
commonplace. In this work, we present an enhanced 
lightweight security protocol for smart device and server 
communications using Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). 
We suggest the use of lightweight symmetric encryption for 
data encryption and asymmetric encryption for key exchange 
protocols in TFTP. The target implementation of secure TFTP 
is for embedded devices such as Wi-Fi Access Points (AP) and 
remote Base Stations (BS). In this paper we present the 
security proofs based on an attack model (IND-CCA2) for 
securing TFTP protocol. We also present the security 
reduction of SSW-ARQ protocol from Cramer-Shoup 
encryption scheme and fixed-time side channel security. We 
have also introduced a novel adversary model in IND-CCA2-
(SC-TA) and it is considered a practical model because the 
model incorporates the timing attack. 
 
Index Terms— Cryptography, TFTP, IND-CCA2, Timing 
Attack, Cramer Shoup, Stop and Wait ARQ, Smart 
Environment, Trivial File Transfer Protocol, Wi-Fi AP, 
Security, Trust, Privacy, STP, Trusted Computing, UBOOT, 
AES, IOT, Access Point, AP, Base Station, BS, WIFI, UDP, 
Lightweight, Asymmetric, Symmetric, Reductionist 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper is a continuation from our previous work.  
Related works with regard to improvements in the 
TFTP protocol had been quiet for almost 10 years. The most 
recent publication was in RFC 3617 (2003)  [1]. The RFC 
3617 mentioned that there is “no mechanism for access 
control within the protocol, and there is no protection from 
a man in the middle attack”. Our publication in 2013 [2] 
proposed an implementation of a lightweight and secure 
TFTP protocol for embedded systems. We proposed a new 
packet header for RRQ, WRQ and OACK. These headers 
provide security information for TFTP’s data payload 
encryption. However, we did not discuss about the 
implementation, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and 
the attack model that could compromise the new proposed 
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TFTP protocol. Also missing was the role of Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) in the overall scheme. The 
MAC must be used to ensure encrypted TFTP data payload 
is unchanged by attackers or transmission bit errors. 
After last year’s publication, it was thought that there is 
no interest from others to use or explore this protocol. 
However, when we checked our personal account in the 
Academia.edu in the Analytics section, we found that almost 
everyday the paper [2] was hit by the search engine for 
almost six months. Recently, we received an email that 
requested advice for a lightweight TFTP protocol in cloud 
computing. We take this as a sign that we need to further 
explore to enhance the TFTP lightweight security scheme. 
This motivates us to continue the research and thus publish 
this paper. 
This paper was written in a general information security 
terminology with a simple mathematical notation (semi-
formal). It is intended for information security practitioners 
and not for mathematicians or cryptographers as the main 
audience. We hope that this paper will give a worthy 
understanding of cryptographic scheme and its security 
proofs. We also understand that it was tough for a non-
mathematical background to grasp the reductionist style. 
Therefore, In this paper we taken a simplistic approach and 
we have skipped  the math intensive parts in the Sections V: 
Security Property and VI: Security Analysis which can be 
obtained from references [3–5]. We hope that, with this 
approach, the reader can easily understand the security 
proofs presented for the TFTP lightweight security scheme 
in designing or implementing a networking protocol or 
application.  
II. RESEARCH GOAL 
A. Objective 
The purpose of this research work is to facilitate security 
in the TFTP protocol. We introduced Cramer-Shoup[3] 
encryption scheme and fixed-time side channel security as 
underlying security protocol for a new secure TFTP. 
B. Motivation 
Referring to our previous work [2], we have mentioned 
the need of a secure TFTP protocol particularly in various 
network administrative tasks such as monitoring and 
upgrading of remote embedded device’s firmware, where a 
lightweight protocol such as TFTP is usually employed. The 
security risks in such situations were also discussed with 
emphasis on concerns due to physical attacks, wherein 
attackers access and modify Wi-Fi AP hardware and 
software [2], [6], [7]. In a preceding work, we proposed an 
enhanced data communication package for DENX-UBOOT 
[8] firmware to include a secure TFTP protocol. However, 
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 our proposal did not suggest a specific cryptographic 
protocol for the successful implementation of the secure 
TFTP protocol. In the effort to further augment the work, a 
proven secure and practical asymmetric cryptographic 
scheme, i.e. the Cramer-Shoup (CS) protocol is proposed to 
be deployed as the underlying cryptographic protocol [3] in 
the overall scheme. . In the latter part, the CS will provide a 
secure asymmetric key exchange, wherein CS will be used 
to encrypt symmetric key (e.g., AES 512) for a secure TFTP 
data communication.   
III. NOTATION AND DESCRIPTION 
A. Operator 
a) Modular Arithmetic (Congruence)1 
     (     )                        
                    
Therefore,  is congruent to   modulo   (or   is 
residue of   modulo  ).        (     ) 
        (     ) 
b) Primitive Root 
                                
           (     )         (     )     
TABLE I 
Primitive Root for Generator   


                         *           +  (      )       
                               (         2          )
      * 
                +
                                       |  |  |  |       
                                       
B. Reduction 
The reduction approach can show that hardness 
(difficulty or intractable) of one problem    implies 
hardness of another problem    given that    has been 
reduced to   . By security reduction, we consider that if 
someone has an algorithm    that can solve a 
computationally hard problem   , then if the same 
algorithm    with a little modification can also solve 
        we can conclude that problem    has been reduced 
to problem    with notation       [9]. The reduction 
technique was used in the NP-completeness theory [10] to 
 
1 Modular arithmetic operation is based on set elements in a finite 
abeliangroup  . One can refer a book “Introduction to modern 
cryptography” [5] for further crypto discussion. The book provides a good 
explanation for non-crypto reader. 
2 It is also called a “cyclic group” wherein all elements in the group are 
generated using single element such as generator  . 
prove the NP-completeness of a problem such that if    is 
NP-complete problem and    is another NP problem; then it 
can prove that    is also an NP-complete problem, if  
     . 
IV. RELATED WORK  
A. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) 
TFTP is a simple protocol that has been widely used for 
transmitting files albeit with limited functionalities [11]. It 
provides upload and download operations using UDP 
protocol. The actual transmission protocol that is used to 
control file transfer is “Simplex Stop and Wait with 
Automatic Repeat reQuest” (SSW-ARQ). TFTP was 
designed as an application for the Internet Protocol  (IP) 
[12] because at that moment, computers or embedded 
systems do not have sufficient memory or lack disk space to 
provide full FTP support. Nowadays, TFTP is quite popular 
and it is used by network administrators to upgrade router 
firmware and to distribute software within a corporate 
network (e.g., DENXU-Boot [8] firmware). Thus, it is 
beneficial for booting embedded devices (e.g., sensor nodes) 
that may not have sufficient volatile memory to store OS 
kernel and applications. 
Recently, there have been some research works which 
have addressed the potential usage of TFTP protocol for 
Radio Frequency (RF) [12], remote attestation for Trusted 
Computing [13] (e.g., Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)), 
lightweight protocol for remote accessing the cloud 
infrastructure [14], Wide Area Network (WAN) surveillance 
system [7], [15] and etc. However, their suggestions to use 
TFTP as medium in their research frameworks are not 
practical and not secure mainly because TFTP exposes all 
data packet in plaintext. The authors should not assume that 
TFTP can provide secure communication (confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity) for data transfer. 
B. Simplex Stop and Wait Automatic Repeat Request 
(SSW-ARQ) 
SSW-ARQ is a simple network protocol used by 
network applications (e.g., TFTP) to enable stop and wait 
flow control in frame transmission when using  unreliable 
UDP/IP stacks [11], [16]. It allows retransmission of frames 
in the event of frame loss or corrupted frame [17][11]. Fig. 1 
shows an example of frame transmission using SSW-ARQ. 
To enable security in this protocol, we may integrate it with 
Cramer-Shoup[3] encryption scheme in the frame data 
payload.  
From Fig. 1, A wants to transmit data or file to B in a 
secure manner. Therefore, both parties need to establish a 
secure key exchange for symmetric encryption (e.g., share 
AES512’s secret keys). Before that, the AES512’s secret 
keys must be shared in a secure communication protocol and 
this can be accomplished  using Cramer-Shoup[3] 
encryption scheme. In this communication setup, both 
parties are pre-installed with Cramer-Shoup’s asymmetric 
keys by the network administrator before this 
communication happen. It is assumed that both parties who 
are communicating with each other are in full knowledge of 
the recipient's public key. 
 
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sorted Result 
g = 3 3 2 6 4 5 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 
g = 4 4 2 1 4 2 1 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 4 , 4 
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Fig. 1.  SSW-ARQ protocol[18] 
 
The communication begins with B who generates the 
AES512’s secret keys. Then, the AES512’s secret keys is 
wrapped (encrypted) using B’s public key. Due to limitation 
of SSW-ARQ’s frame size, a ciphertext generated using B’s 
public key must be divided into chunks that fit into the 
frame. After that, A will transmit multiple frame segments 
containing the chunks of ciphertext. However, the SSW-
ARQ communication protocol allows only one frame to be 
sent at one time. The next frame will be transmitted after 
receiving a correct acknowledgement (ACK) from B. At this 
stage, all transmitted frame must verify that it is free from 
data corruption (e.g., bit-error) using the checksum function. 
After all frames has been successfully transmitted, B will 
assemble all frame segments into the complete ciphertext 
string. After that, B will call Cramer-Shoup[3] decryption 
function to decrypt the ciphertext and then retrieve the 
AES512’s secret keys. Finally, A will encrypt the file using 
the AES512’s secret keys and send the encrypted file using 
standard TFTP protocol. B will decrypt the file using the 
AES512’s secret keys. However, in this paper, we will not 
discuss the usage of symmetric encryption scheme and its 
security. 
Fig. 2.  A simplified Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme 
 
C. Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme 
Cramer-Shoup[3] protocol is proven secure against IND-
CCA2. The protocol provides an improvement of El-
Gamal[19] wherein the El-Gamal is vulnerable to chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA). However, the Cramer-Shoup is 
slower than the El-Gamal (approximately twice)  in 
performing cryptographic computation [20]. To compare 
against RSA, Cramer-Shoup is slower in the encryption 
process but it is slightly equal in the decryption process [20]. 
We illustrate the Cramer-Shoup protocol in Fig. 2. 
V. SECURITY PROPERTY  
A. IND-CCA2 
Indistinguishability-Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 
[21] is an attack that allows  an adversary to access a 
decryption function through the decryption oracle. The 
adversary can ask the oracle to decrypt any ciphertext except 
the one that being use for indistinguishability test. The IND-
CCA2 allows the Adversary to get a decryption of ciphertext 
from the oracle in Phase 1(before) and Phase 2 (after) the 
challenge messages (           |  |  |  |) are issued 
to Challenger. 
For the indistinguishability test, the adversary will send 
two plaintext messages (     ) to the Challenger. In place 
of a fair indistinguishability experiment, both plaintext 
messages must never be used for decryption using the 
oracle. This means that the adversary could never know the 
ciphertext of both messages after the encryption function 
has been applied. Referring to Fig. 3, the Challenger will 
choose randomly either        to be encrypted. 
Ciphertext    of the encrypted message        is sent to 
the Adversary. The Adversary need to distinguish the 








, we can conclude that the Adversary has an 
“advantage” and the given protocol is considered not secure 
in terms of indistinguishability. 
     ( )                                     , 
                                          






Fig. 3.  IND-CCA2’s Experiment 
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(Side Channel – Timing Attack) is an attack that allows an 
adversary to access identical computing resources in terms 
of computing power (e.g., CPU). The adversary is given 
knowledge of time to perform cryptographic computations 
(e.g., primitive computation and protocol execution). These 
were included given that the adversary has knowledge of the 
delay of network transmission for all transactions in  Phase 
1, Phase 2 and Challenge phase (refer to Fig. 4). The 
adversary also has the knowledge of IND-CCA2 given that 
the Adversary’s “advantage” over random guessing in 
indistinguishability test with Timing-Attack is: 
     ( )                                     , 
                                         (     )  





VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
A. Cramer-Shoup with IND-CCA2 
Adversary Model: Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 
(CCA2). 
Security Claim: 
1.1) Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) problem is 
hard [4] in a cyclic group  ;  
1.2) Hash function is a universal one-way hash function 
with strong collision-resistant [3], [22];  Then, Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme is secure against CCA2 using 
indistinguishability test. 
Security Reduction: An adversary claims that he can break 
Cramer-Shoup protocol using an efficient algorithm   in a 
program  . To test the adversary claim, we conduct an 
experiment by taking the program   and put a simple 
―wrapper‖ into it, and we call it program   . The program 
   will use the program   as a sub-routine in the 
experiment. Then, the program    will run the IND-CCA2 
experiment with random input   and with expected output 
   in indistinguishability test. The adversary is considered a 
winner in the experiment, if the probabilities to guess for all 




/   ( ), where  ( ) is the Adversary’s success 
probability. Due to the non-negligible advantage, the 
program    can break the Cramer-Shoup protocol. However, 
if there are no other efficient programs (including program 
  )  that can win in the experiment with non-negligible 
advantage, the Cramer-Shoup protocol won the experiment 
with negligible advantage of program   . Since the Security 
Claims (1.1 and 1.2) in the previous paragraph used strong 
primitive assumptions (DDHP is hard and collision-
resistance of hash function), the program   ’s advantage 
over probabilistic polynomial-time
3
 is negligible. Therefore, 
the program    lost in the experiment by indistinguishability 
test with a negligible advantage and the adversary claim was 
invalid (false) in that it “can break Cramer-Shoup protocol 
using all efficient algorithm   in a program  ”.  
B. SSW-ARQ with IND-CCA2-(CS-TA) 
Adversary Model: Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack-
(Side Channel – Timing Attack). 
Security Claim: 
2.1) SSW-ARQ inherits all security strength from the 
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and the Cramer-Shoup 
encryption scheme was proven secure in the IND-CCA2. 
2.2) SSW-ARQ is secure against Timing Attack using fixed-
time of runtime for all fixed input length in the function in a 
polynomial time; in non-formal description: Any same 
function that receives any valid input with the same length 
(e.g.,  (   )      (   )       | (   )|  | (   )| will have 
identical runtime or execution for all conditions; Then, 
SSW-ARQ protocol is secure against CCA2-(CS-TA) using 
indistinguishability test. 
Security Reduction: For the Security Claim 2.1), it was 
easy to observe the security proof because Cramer-Shoup 
encryption scheme was embedded into SSW-ARQ protocol. 
All strings (e.g., ciphertext, public key) that are generated by 
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme are divided into chunks 
that are fitted into the SSW-ARQ’s frame. Any modification 
(even a single bit error) in the SSW-ARQ’s frame will result 
in a failure in Message Authentication Codes (MAC) in the 
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. This good security 
property was derived from the collision-resistant hash 
function. Therefore, “Given that Security Claim 2.1 is true, 
the SSW-ARQ is secure against IND-CCA2”. 
For the Security Claim 2.2), we can use a similar 
experiment that is used for Cramer-Shoup encryption 
scheme except that an adversary are given knowledge of 
runtime  performance  of cryptographic computation and  
network transmission delay. 
Referring to Security Claim 2.2, it is impossible to attain the 
same fixed time for the encryption and decryption process of 
different input strings of ciphertext (with same length 
ciphertext and different key) using specific  encryption 
functions or decryption functions. Running time to compute 
an exponential such as   and      is different because of 
the different computer machine capabilities in performing 
addition to representing multiplication as well as the 
 
3 ―polynomial-time‖ is a term used for measuring an algorithm’s running 
time as a function, wherein it is measured by length of its input into the 
function [5]. E.g. function ( ) take        as input string during 
execution, then the running time is  . 
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 different limitations of hardware data bus. It might be 
similar for small inputs of 32-bits or 64-bits length, but it is 
not so for crypto numbers with extensive lengths such as 
2048-bits length of public key. From a practical point of 
view, we can use a subset of the assumption from the 
Security Claim 2.2, “a fixed-time is based on worst-case 
scenario to do encryption or decryption process for all 
string of plaintext or ciphertext that has the same length and 
within the same cyclic group   of prime order q” as 
Security Claim 2.2.1. The Security Claim 2.2.1 show that if 
we run the IND-CCA2-(SC-TA)’s experiment as shown in 
the Fig. 4, the program    was lost in the experiment by 
indistinguishability test with a negligible advantage. This 
happened because the program    cannot distinguish 
whether the ciphertext   was either         with a given 
worst case fixed-time. For example that based on Fig. 4, if a 
given message size of     * +
           * +
    , 
and the encryption function always gives worst case  time, 
    (    (   (     ))       ). The probability to guess 
a correct message by program   is (
 
 
) for either 
        :  
   = (    (   (     )        ) 
   = (    (   (     )        ) 
The program    needs to distinguish the ciphertext   
through the timing knowledge of time    . However, the 
program   ’s knowledge of time     from the oracle in Phase 
1(before) and Phase 2 (after) is not helpful to give non-
negligible advantage in the indistinguishability test. Since 
the Security Claims (2.1 and 2.2.1) in the previous 
paragraph used the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and 
the fixed-time (worst-case scenario) security assumptions, 
thus the program    ’s advantage over probabilistic 
polynomial-time is negligible. Therefore, the program     
lost in the experiment by indistinguishability test with a 
negligible advantage and the adversary claim was invalid 
(false) in that it “can break the new fixed-time SSW-ARQ 
protocol (with the IND-CCA2-(SC-TA) attack model) using 
all efficient algorithm   in a program  ”. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
We propose to implement security in the TFTP protocol. 
Sections V and VI has discussed the security properties and 
security proofs with a strong assumptions of cryptographic 
primitive. Both sections only showed the security of SSW-
ARQ protocol against IND-CCA2-(SC-TA) but not the 
TFTP protocol wherein the SSW-ARQ protocol is a subset 
of the TFTP protocol. In our case, TFTP is just an 
application that manages file transfer and key management. 
The TFTP will invoke the file transfer using SSW-ARQ 
protocol and passes a security related key that is needed by 
SSW-ARQ protocol to perform cryptographic computation 
(e.g., Cramer-Shoup protocol). Therefore, to prove that the 
TFTP application is secure, the TFTP must be programmed 
to follow the standard [23], [24] and practice [25] for a 
secure application. However, this is beyond the scope of this 
research paper. 
A secure key management protocol in the TFTP 
application plays an important role to ensure all 
cryptographic schemes are secure. Bad implementation of 
key management will expose the cryptographic scheme 
through many side-channel attacks such as timing attacks, 
power monitoring attacks and etc. These security 
vulnerabilities can be exploited in generating, distributing 
and managing cryptographic keys for embedded devices 
(e.g., RaspberryPi board) and DENX-UBOOT’s TFTP 
application. Tamper resistant devices can be integrated into 
embedded hardware for protecting the cryptographic keys 
such as TPM chip [26]. To minimize our research scope, we 
have not considered the physical security attacks and the 
side-channel attacks except for timing attacks in TFTP. 
We have introduced a novel adversary model in IND-
CCA2-(SC-TA). This adversary model includes knowledge 
of time to perform cryptographic computation. This makes 
the Adversary become more powerful than adversary model 
in IND-CCA2. For example, if the timing attack is mounted 
into the IND-CCA2, the Adversary has a significance non-
negligible advantage. The Adversary can build a timing 
dictionary for every request of decryption of ciphertext    
with time    in Phase 1 and Phase 2. The timing dictionary 
will give a non-negligible advantage to the Adversary to 
choose a correct encrypted message by a given ciphertext   
in the Challenge process. 
However, the timing dictionary for the IND-CCA2-(SC-
TA) is unable to choose the correct encrypted message 
because of fixed-time constraint in (          ). We believe 
that, the IND-CCA2-(SC-TA)’s adversary model will 
provide a sufficient proof to assert that SSW-ARQ protocol 
is secure in the indistinguishability test and secure in timing 
attack. The fixed-time using ―worst-case scenario” is a 
practical solution to be implemented in the DENX-
UBOOT’s TFTP application. One may think that using 
“worst-case scenario” slows down the security computation 
but based on observations in our laboratory, to transmit a 
file (e.g., Linux Kernel “wheezy-raspbian”[27] 2.8MB size) 
using DENX-UBOOT’s TFTP application; the required 
Estimated Time of Completion (ETC) is around 15-30 
seconds. Adding an extra 3-7 seconds to implement the 
security protocol in the DENX-UBOOT’s TFTP application 
can be considered quite negligible. 
VIII. CONTRIBUTION 
The overall view of this paper and its contributions were 
mapped in the Fig. 5. Based on our current and previous 
effort [2], [6], [7], we have discussed a security framework, 
method and protocol which would secure TFTP 
communication. In this paper, we are focused on proving 
that the enhanced TFTP protocol is secure using a semi-
formal notation and reduction technique. The security proofs 
of TFTP protocol that is given by us can be used in 
Common Criteria’s Evaluation Assurance Level 6 (EAL6) 
[24]. The EAL6 accept a semi-formal verified design and 
security test for a target system (e.g., secure TFTP). We 
have performed a security analysis and demonstrated that 
the enhanced TFTP is resistant to attacker penetrations 
related to IND-CCA2 and IND-CCA2-(SC-TA). We have 
also introduced a novel adversary model in IND-CCA2-(SC-
TA) and it is a practical model used to test resistance against 
timing-attack. For an implementation of secure TFTP, we 
have provided the proofs and the practical implementation 
of this new protocol can be initiated. A proper 
implementation of secure TFTP will ensure remote system 
updating and patching (e.g., firmware, kernel or application) 
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 are secure from attempts to eavesdrop and modify the 
TFTP’s packet. ―Mohd Anuar Mat Isa”  
Fig. 5.  Summary of security protocol with adversary model 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented the security proof and an 
attack model for a secure TFTP protocol. We also presented 
the security reduction of SSW-ARQ protocol from Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme and fixed-time side channel 
security. The secure TFTP protocol would overcome 
security problems (confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity) in controlling, monitoring and upgrading 
embedded infrastructure in a pervasive computing 
environment. The target implementation of secure TFTP is 
for embedded devices such as Wi-Fi Access Points (AP), 
remote Base Stations (BS) and wireless sensor nodes. In the 
next stage of our research work, we want to implement a 
secure TFTP in radio frequency (RF) communication for 
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) in electrical pylon 
tower. 
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